Chinese Agribusiness Investment in Mekong Countries: Are Overseas Economic Expansion Strategies Doing Local Communities Good? (part 2)

Rubber in Burma

In Burma, the coercive land encroachment caused by army involvement seems to be even worse, since most of the Chinese agricultural investment is located in the areas controlled by the either local or regional military authorities; such as military groups, militia and ceasefire groups. According to the cases in Shan state and Kachin state, both of which are the priorities for Burmese government to welcome the rubber bulk invested by China, it is quite undoubted that Opium Replacement scheme can hardly reach its humanitarian goals.

On the other hand, the enforcement of opium bans in the mid-2000s is depriving the population of its primary source of income. The introduction of Opium Replacement and rubber plantation from China was meant to be offering impoverished ex-opium farmers with comparable income, but what has happened could not accomplish the real income increase generally.

Usually it’s either Burmese military, militia or ceasefire groups which have to endorse over the joint venture between Chinese investors and Burmese company. And many farmers say they were forced to work on plantations, or forced to grow these crops on their land, without clear agreement on payment.[1]

Sometimes they have no compensation after the land concession. Although some farmers get the sources of income, the over-reliance on Chinese market can make their income unstable.

Reflection on the Opium Replacement

In spite of the criticism, during the interview in 2008, Hongzhen Qu, the chairman of rubber industry in China said “I’ve never heard of these bad deeds overseas made by Chinese companies. But I think that Chinese companies should keep good relations with local residents.” Chinese agribusiness still remained its ignorance over the negative impacts made by them.

From the governmental perspectives, there have been some reviews over the shortcomings of Opium Replacement. For instance, China-Burma border has been found that some Chinese traders abuse the schemes by pretending to plant crops, but in fact are only buying up local produce from farmers in Burma, bringing it into China free of customs duty, and making inordinate profit.[2] This problem made Chinese government review the Opium Replacement policy in 2010, but so far there is no possibility that the policy will be suspended.

Moreover, the Chinese government has noticed the over-production of rubber, and has been prohibiting the new rubber investors in recent 2 years. And the proposal for “Development Replacement” has been raised to reflect on the problems of the Opium Replacement which has failed to support the ex-poppy farms with alternative incomes and solve the local poverty.

Pulp and Paper in Southern Laos

In the year since China enacted its logging bans, it became the world’s largest importer of tropical logs, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization. Its imports swelled nearly nine-fold in a decade, reaching USD 5.5 billion in 2006, according to China’s State Forestry Administration.[3]

On the other hand, China has become the biggest pulp consumption market and the biggest pulp production base in the world. It has attracted several world-largest pulp enterprises to establish the Chinese branches. This expansion, along with the domestic increasing cost of land, labour and environmental standards, has pushed China to seek Southeast Asia as the most important supply chains. Southern Laos is the place which gathers the Chinese plantation of eucalyptus and acacia.

Sun Paper is the biggest Chinese pulp and paper enterprise. It has considered southern Laos as the most important plantation base. But there is a history of this sort of project in Laos, and the most notorious being the Asian Development Bank's Industrial Tree Plantation Project. In December 2005, the ADB's Operations Evaluation Department concluded that the ADB project had “failed to improve the socioeconomic conditions of intended beneficiaries, as people were driven further into poverty by having to repay loans that financed failed plantations.” Put another way, the farmers that Sun Paper hopes will grow its trees for them need their land to grow food on.[4]

In 2007, the Lao government suspended the issuance of new land concessions “after learning such arrangements were negatively affecting local communities”, as the Vientiane Times put it.[5]But the lease concession contract is not suspended forever; the formal lease concession contract between Laos Sun Paper Co. and Lao National Land Management Authority was signed in Oct. 2010.[6]

[1] Laos: Chinese company Sun Paper plans eucalyptus monocultures, Chris Lang, 2009

[2] Laos: Chinese company Sun Paper plans eucalyptus monocultures, Chris Lang, 2009

[3] China Green Times, Oct. 12^th, 2010

[4] From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt? The Future of Opium Bans in the Kokang and Wa Regions, Tom Kramer, 2009

[5] Alternative Development or Business as Usual? China’s Opium Substitution Policy in Burma and Laos, Transnational Institute, Nov. 2010

[6] Corruption Stains Timber Trade: Forest Destroyed in China’s Race to Feed Global Wood-Processing Industry, Washington Post, Apr. 1^st, 2007

Chinese Agribusiness Investment in Mekong Countries: Are Overseas Economic Expansion Strategies Doing Local Communities Good? (Part 1)

It has been 10 years since Chinese government started to carry out the “Zou Chu Qu” (走出去，Going Out) economic and diplomatic strategies in 2001. The policy’s purpose is strategically activating the Chinese overseas investment in order to deal with its domestic lack of raw materials. The key commodities are included, not only petroleum, iron, coal, but also the agricultural produce. The agribusiness going out is promoted widely and has reached different regions, including Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia, etc.

Chinese agribusiness is proliferating in the five Mekong countries; Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and Burma. Pros and cons coexist; on one hand, Chinese government sees it as the means of supplying the fast-growing domestic demand, agribusiness sees it as opportunities of less cost and more profit, and recipient countries see it as a method of agitating economy. On the other hand, the policy has caused a lot of controversies, such as the land grabbing conflicts between local communities and businesses, environmental degradation and pollution, bribery and poverty, etc.

These problems occur mostly in the three poorest countries in Mekong region, i.e. Burma, Laos and Cambodia. The cases in Burma and Laos have more to do with the “Opium Replacement Policy” which is originally implemented by Yunnan government to eliminate the opium plantation and smuggling in the Golden Triangle. The Yunnan Government claims that during the Eleventh-Five period (year 2006~year 2010), more than 100 companies from Yunnan have done the Opium Replacement projects in Burma and Laos. The rough statistics shows that the total plantation area is more than 3 million mu (1 hectare is equal to 15 mu), with the accumulated investment of more than CNY 1 billion. The plantation is concentrated in 7 provinces in Northern Laos, and Shan and Kachin States in Burma.[1] However, the situations in the three countries are all driven by “Going Out” and “Soft Power Diplomacy”, which has raised the overseas agribusiness investment policy t to national level in names of economic expansion and collaboration.

Rubber in Laos and Burma

Rubber has been one of the vital strategic resources in China. After several decades of massive production, the environmental degradation and land shortage, along with the fast-growing industrial demand and over-reliance on rubber import, China started to seek rubber plantation overseas. Laos and Burma are the priorities for the sake of their cheap land cost, and secondary consideration of their cheap labour.

The Opium Replacement policy started to be implemented in 1992. The main purpose is replacing the opium plantation with other crops in Golden Triangle, including rubber, sugarcane, cassava, etc. Since the main cause of the opium plantation is the long-term poverty experienced by the local villagers, most of whom do swidden cultivation in the mountainous areas where other economic resources hardly reach, the policy has the objective of offering better income for them. In addition, it was far earlier than Going Out, and it was not until its ascent to national level and Going Out that the two countries in the Triangle got the Chinese-invested agriculture boom, especially rubber plantation.

Northern Laos and Burma are influenced by the Chinese offshore rubber plantation most, and almost all large-scale rubber plantation and concession in northern Laos and northern Burma are the result from the subsidies incentives of Opium Replacement and Going Out, although other foreign institutions and national governments also have the related promotions to some extent.

Rubber Boom and Land Concession: Local People’s livelihoods are affected in Northern Laos

Based on the regulation of Opium Replacement, the minimum plantation area is 10,000 mu to obtain the subsidies. Therefore, the regulation is already bias to Chinese companies which have the capacity of doing large-scale plantations.

Yunnan State Farm’s investment in Northern Laos is under the national directive by Vice President Wu Yi, and most Chinese rubber companies operating in the area are privately owned and motivated by the direct subsidies, including to the cost of exploration stage, land, etc.

In order to operate in Northern Laos, land concession and contract farming are the most common ways for the Chinese agribusiness. Due to the majority of smallholder farmers and provincial governments’ preference in Luang Namtha, Bokeo and Oudomxai, these three provinces formed an official consensus that land concessions should not be given to the investors, however, they could not resist while the Opium Replacement started to be strongly introduced. And even Yunnan Rubber, a Lao subsidiary of Yunnan State Farms, obtained a concession of 214 ha in Sub Tod, Luang Namtha.[2] This case should be viewed as the national level’s agreement between Laos and China; Yunnan Rubber has a national contract signed by the Chinese Prime Minister, to develop 2.5 million mu (or 166,667 ha) of rubber in four provinces of Northern Laos, including Luang Namtha, Bokeo, Sayabouri and Oudomxai, of which 0.5 million are to be developed as demonstration plantations, i.e. concessions.[3]

Land grabbing conflicts are sometimes cause by the continuous collusion between the Lao military and Chinese companies, and very often the Lao authority is ignorant or intentionally ignorant about the unofficial military contracts with the investors. The Lao army sees rubber as a promising income generating activity. Without the capacity to develop plantations on its own, the army looks across the border for partners. At least three different Chinese companies contract with the provincial army to plant rubber, including Ruifeng along the Mekong River in the Long district, Heli along the eastern border of the Mom cluster in Sing district, and a third company also in Mom to the west.[4]

Local villagers are the victims under the collusion, since the concession which is supposed to use the military land often triggers the dispute over the legitimate ownership belonged to military or local people. For instance, the military concession in Ban Chagnee forced local swidden cultivation farmers to cede their land with gunfire, and the food security started to be threatened.

Is Contract Farming in Northern Laos Better than Land Concession?

In addition to land concession, the other common way operated by Chinese agribusiness in Northern Laos is contract farming. The contract farming is often carried out as “2+3”, i.e. the villagers provide land and labour (“2” production elements), and investors provide capital, technique and market access (“3” production elements). And the villagers get the 55%~70% of the proceeds, which are valued by the market price of the latex. Although “2+3” is promoted by the provincial governments, “1+4” scheme is more common in reality; meaning villagers get paid according to the land they offer, the proceeds are base on 30% of the market latex price and the payment time can be tapping time or before it. Sometimes the companies obtain a certain share of rubber trees to avoid the legal procedure of land concession. In the “1+4” case, villagers can be waged labour of the investors, but sometimes the plantation is too big to employ all the all of the local population.

Because of the both schemes with the precondition of land titles and the income uncertainty of 7 years before tapping, most the beneficiaries are villagers who have the formal access to land and certain economic resources, and contract farming is supposed to benefit them more than concession. Nevertheless, upland farmers who have been practicing swidden cultivation and have no formal land titles are even more marginalised. Ironically, upland farmers account for the majority of opium growers or ex-opium growers. The contract farming introduced by the Chinese agribusiness obeying to Opium Replacement can hardly help the poorest of the poor, but coerce them to relocate and abandon swidden cultivation practices, which mean the food self-sufficiency for them.

(To be continued)

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[1] Xinhua News, Jan. 1^st, 2011

[2] Rubber Boom in Luang Namtha: A Transnational Perspective, Weiyi Shi, Feb. 2008

[3] Rubber Boom in Luang Namtha: A Transnational Perspective, Weiyi Shi, Feb. 2008

[4] Rubber Boom in Luang Namtha: A Transnational Perspective, Weiyi Shi, Feb. 2008

Why Chinese Agricultural Overseas Investment is important: from People’s Perspectives

The NGO that I presently work for, Focus on the Global South has been dealing with the issue over farmland grabbing in Mekong region. As China has become a vital role in this region in terms of foreign aid and investment, and the agricultural investment accounts for the growing percentage of them, my main work at Focus is to keep tracking on the Chinese agribusiness investment in Mekong countries.

The global food crisis has triggered many emerging developing countries to seek overseas farmlands to supply their domestic food need, and the leading countries include China, Middle East countries, South Korea, India, etc. China, with its 1.3 billion people’s population who start to consume more meat, is definitely under global attention; it has claimed that its goal of overseas farmlands is 2 million hectare, and the main targeted countries are the Philippines, Brazil, Argentina, Kazakhstan, Laos, etc.

This trend is not limited to food production. Biofuel, rubber, pulp and timber plantation has also been proliferating due to the worry about the lack of these economies’ resources to supply the need for economic growth.

Most of the policy-makers and politicians worldwide see this recent tendency as changing geopolitics, since there is no much recent development of the offshore agriculture supply control made by the US and EU countries because of their economic crisis, and it seems that the emerging economies are expanding their agriculture production bases especially in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America with the influx of investment or aid which can meanwhile develop the host countries economies. However, what’s more worrisome is whether this tendency will lead to the land grab conflicts, not only among these emerging developing countries and host countries, but also among the investing companies and the local communities.

When it comes to the bad deeds made by Chinese enterprises, people usually refer to its notorious image of bullying, bribery and ignorance about the local opposition. The recent wide concern about the Chinese overseas agricultural investment is not in Mekong region, but in Latin America. Last year it was confirmed that the Chinese state-owned agribusiness company Beidahuang (北大荒農墾) had signed an agreement, with the government of Patagonia's Río Negro province, Argentina, which provides the framework for it to acquire up to 320,000 hectares of privately owned farmland, along with irrigation rights and a concession on the San Antonio port.[1] The farmland is to provide soya back to China, since soya is mainly controlled by four world’s biggest agricultural enterprises, i.e. ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus.

Argentinian environmental groups and constitutional experts are outraged. The law experts are worried that the Chinese have been buying Argentinian land for five years, but the land should prioritise the local people’s need. And the excessive concentration of land will push away small and middle-sized owners.

Environmentalists in Río Negro say the Chinese arrival will mean heavy use of agrochemicals, ecological degradation and severe strain on the region's water resources. Some of the land in question is virgin forest that would be deforested.

And since soya cultivation is highly mechanised it will prompt unemployment in the area, as it has elsewhere in the country where many rural communities have seen an increase in deep poverty as jobs are lost.[2]

The land conflicts caused by the Chinese food production also happened in Asia. According to the article “The New Geopolitics of Food”, released by Foreign Policy this April, local hostility toward such land grabs is the rule, not the exception. In 2007, as food prices were starting to rise, China signed an agreement with the Philippines to lease 2.5 million acres of land slated for food crops that would be shipped home. Once word leaked, the public outcry -- much of it from Filipino farmers -- forced Manila to suspend the agreement.[3]

Although it is still too early to judge how much the Mekong countries will be affected by Chinese recent expansion of offshore agricultural supply, the previous investment experiences have led to a lot of controversy between the local residents and the investors, especially in Laos, Burma and Cambodia. For instance, northern Laos and Burma are influenced by the Chinese offshore rubber plantation most, and almost all large-scale rubber plantation and concession in northern Laos and northern Burma are the result from the subsidies incentives of Opium Replacement and Going Out policies. Land grabbing conflicts are sometimes cause by the continuous collusion between the Lao military and Chinese companies, and very often the Lao authority is ignorant or intentionally ignorant about the unofficial military contracts with the investors. The Lao army sees rubber as a promising income generating activity. Without the capacity to develop plantations on its own, the army looks across the border for partners. At least three different Chinese companies contract with the provincial army to plant rubber, including Ruifeng along the Mekong River in the Long district, Heli along the eastern border of the Mom cluster in Sing district, and a third company also in Mom to the west.[4]

Meanwhile, local villagers are the victims under the collusion, since the concession which is supposed to use the military land often triggers the dispute over the legitimate ownership belonged to military or local people. For instance, the military concession in Ban Chagnee forced local swidden cultivation farmers to cede their land with gunfire, and the food security started to be threatened.

According to the official statistics, the total Chinese accumulated overseas investment in 2009 was USD 245.75 billion, and agricultural sector was only USD 2.03 billion, which accounted for 0.8%. However, China has claimed that it would promote agribusiness to do overseas investment; the highest subsidy one company can get annually is CNY 30 million this year. Also, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Commerce are drafting the strategies of agricultural going out, including the policies of finance, fiscal, taxation, and insurance, and Ministry of Agriculture is drafting "agricultural cooperation: the development plan for twelfth five. (i.e. year 2011~2015)" It is expected that the Chinese government will accelerate its overseas agriculture expansion, and the impact on Mekong countries is worth our concerns.

[1] Global food crisis: China land deal causes unease in Argentina, Guardian, June 1^st, 2011. Original source:http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jun/01/china-land-deal-unease-argentina-agribusiness

[2] Global food crisis: China land deal causes unease in Argentina, Guardian, June 1^st, 2011. Original source:http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jun/01/china-land-deal-unease-argentina-agribusiness

[3] The New Geopolitics of Food, Lester R. Brown, Foreign Policy, April 25^th, 2011. Original source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_new_geopolitics_of_food

[4] Rubber Boom in Luang Namtha: A Transnational Perspective, Weiyi Shi, Feb. 2008

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綠色經濟(Green Economy)：新議程仍是貪婪經濟

一九九二年在巴西里約舉行的地球高峰會(Earth Summit)，明年即將屆滿二十年。地球高峰會，決定了之後造就京都議定書的聯合國氣候變遷綱要公約，以及生物多樣性公約等國際環境公約。二十年後，儘管環境災難更加層出不窮，卻不見各國一同履行解決之道，在各公約的推進上達成具體有效共識；比如最受矚目的氣候變遷會議，成為富國逃避責任的場合，京都議定書的存廢仍舊不樂觀。而另一方面，「市場至上」成為各國政策制定的主流做法，富國的實施經驗推動了發展中國家的跟進，實際上則是讓理應大刀闊斧進行經濟模式轉型的國家，反倒有了繼續追求財富積累的辦法。其中最新的發展之一便是「綠色經濟」(Green Economy)；該議程近來在聯合國會議受到廣泛注意與討論，且明年六月四日至六日舉行的里約+20(Rio+20)也將以「永續發展與消除貧窮下的綠色經濟」為主題進行。

根據今年二月二十四日聯合國環境規劃屬(United Nations Environment Programme)舉辦的執行理事會(Governing Council)所決定的Rio+20主題，其中綠色經濟的益處、機會與挑戰包括：

「須要從保護環境免於受商業利用，到利用商業模式以保護環境。」

第二十四段：….全球市場可為清潔的產品、貨品和服務運轉，且貿易為關鍵角色。世界貿易組織扮演處理相關議題的角色和過程。當開發中國家受鼓勵採納綠色經濟策略，許多國家會因為其可能無法進入市場而猶豫。

第二十七段：給予轉型至綠色經濟的財務支持應同時考慮具創新性的財務機制，包括潛在的新金融工具，以刺激投資和帶動技術轉移。(若從其他的聯合國文件，便可發現很明顯地，這些機制即為碳交易、減少毀林及森林退化造成的溫室氣體排放(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, REDD)和環境服務支付(Payments for Environmental Services, PES))

第二十八段：開發中國家需要已開發國家提供的轉型至綠色經濟的支持；其中給予開發中國家財務協助以轉型至綠色經濟是最重要的，特別是投資在科技或基礎建設常常是最大的挑戰。

不幸地，從綠色經濟中最大的受益者將是一小群的銀行家和工程師，和這二十年來因不斷推出的主流環境政策而出現的大大受益者無異。在「氣候正義，現在就要！」網絡中的ETC Group便撰文指出，UNEP發表的兩份報告─《生態系統和生物多樣性的經濟學》(The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity)和《綠色經濟報告》(Green Economy Report)是推動綠色經濟的重要文件。報告中提到大自然的各項功能服務應該藉由可交易、增加保育資金的投資權支付。另外，新的「具生態效率」的科技應該增加生態服務的價值，同時創造收入。撰寫照兩份報告的人即是在德意志銀行服務的銀行家，而最大力提倡的即是達沃斯世界經濟論壇中最富有的五百大企業和G8的外交官。

同樣令人憂心的是綠色經濟中討論的「綠色科技」；根據UNEP的報告，綠色科技包含促使糧價攀升的生質能，對核能的態度不清，還替基改作物背書。

不過，不僅是氣候正義的網絡對綠色經濟框架下的市場機制提出了強烈質疑和批評；許多開發中國家政府也對純然利用經濟手法解決環境問題開始存疑，且開發中國家和已開發國家對綠色經濟的定義不同，讓雙方的歧見加深。當然其中最大力反對的國家為玻利維亞。在今年三月於紐約聯合國總部舉行的Rio+20準備會議中，玻利維亞大使巴布羅˙索隆(Pablo Solón)質疑綠色經濟本質上仍是綠色資本主義，充斥投資炒作意味，將轉移我們針對Rio+20應討論議題的注意力。

社會運動團體不斷對綠色經濟提出批評，某種程度上也讓政策有了轉向的機會。比如UNEP將面臨在聯合國中升等的挑戰，另外聯合國永續發展委員會(United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development)也沒辦法成為有效執行的單位。有分析家認為，明年的Rio+20無法得出具體結論，最終會如同哥本哈根的氣候峰會般破局；重要的是市場機制的問題能藉此機會更受到矚目，進一步發展非市場機制的解決方案。

四月初在曼谷的氣候變遷峰會間會議

文／圖 陳思穎

四月份的第一個週日開始，聯合國氣候變遷綱要公約(UNFCCC)的會間會議在曼谷的聯合國大樓進行了一個星期的協商；開發中和已開發國家間就去年底協商產生出的「坎昆協議」繼續討論，但雙方的歧見仍舊相當大。

當然，氣候正義的網絡不曾在國際協商中缺席。除了「國際地球之友」(Friends of the Earth International)於

場內的發言，「南方福音」(Jubilee South)的系列論壇與場外遊行，Focus也在會議期間和泰國氣候正義工作小組(Thai Working Group on Climate Justice)於場外舉辦了的遊行與論壇；場內的協商從一開始就被認為無法推動實質進展，對Focus和泰國氣候正聯盟來說，場外的共識集結更顯重要。

會議開幕第一天，「碳交易是什麼？」的論壇，目標聽眾鎖定在泰國人，也是Focus在多次國際談判的行動後，回到泰國國內進行公眾教育的起點。而當天的腳踏車遊行，雖然碰到紅衫軍聚集在聯合國大樓外，不免被模糊了焦點，但在泰國本地也算是一場具有創新性的遊行。

(圖說：氣候正義遊行)

第二天和第三天的論壇，主辦單位請到了湄公河國家，包括泰國、寮國、柬埔寨、越南關心氣候變遷的公民團體和原住民團體，菲律賓氣候正義運動(Philippine Movement for Climate Justice；PMCJ)進行「REDD(減少毀林及森林退化造成的溫室氣體排放， Reduction in Emission from Deforestation and forest Degradation)之政治經濟」和「大地之母權利」(Rights of the Mother Earth)的兩大主題討論。由於近幾年Focus於氣候議題的主要參與著重在國際談判時的場內發言、針對協商代表團的遊說與場外倡議，在回到草根團體的討論也就相對較少，而這次的論壇也很難得地請到了這些團體，釐清REDD在各國發展的情形、對在地弱勢族群的衝擊，以及去年坎昆協商由玻利維亞總統與協商團提出的「大地之母權利」對在地社區的意義為何，試圖進一步將其擬為條文，放入正式協商的討論內容。

REDD之政治經濟

「REDD之政治經濟」由「REDD監察網」(REDD Monitor；http://www.redd-monitor.org/)的負責人，並長期關注湄公河地區土地開發、林業與伐林議題的Chris Lang[1]開場。Chris以國際局勢的角度切入，分析REDD的現況與問題。

REDD的邏輯，簡言之即為南方國家應該因其保有森林取代伐林而受到財務的報償，而具體內容又分為減少伐林造成的溫室氣體排放、減少森林退化造成的溫室氣體排放、保有森林的儲碳力、森林的永續管理、增加森林的儲碳力五大項。然而，該五大項卻有許多定義上的漏洞；如保育的意義仍為過去國家公園設立的邏輯，忽略原住民的領域的其對保育的角色、森林的永續管理不乏對大規模伐林的補貼、增加儲碳力可能鼓勵大規模的單一植林。

儘管氣候協商仍未討論出REDD最終應如何執行，目前的情勢看來已脫不了和兩個機制掛勾─碳交易和世界銀行。(去年我寫的《COP16的氣候正義運動》一文中已提到REDD+放到市場交易)。世銀的「森林碳夥伴基金」(Forest Carbon Partnership Facility)也很明確地指出，REDD的終極目標便是放入碳交易機制中。除了碳交易本身無法真正減碳，和其製造極為複雜的計算方式，以產生衍生性金融商品便於炒作外，REDD進入碳交易後也將讓對保育森林一無所知的碳交易者圈地炒作森林碳匯。而目前世銀實施REDD的基金相當多元，包括雙邊和多邊的方式，其動機無非是希望用快速的方式提供資金給開發中國家。

泰國、柬埔寨、寮國、越南、菲律賓的團體，亦就各自遇到的相關情形相互分享；他們普遍遇到原住民的權利不受政府認可、森林定義認定不夠嚴謹、對當地民眾的財務補償不周，甚至泰國的案例遇到了森林碳匯放到芝加哥自願性碳交易市場，與根據合約該林業公司在十五年後仍然可按照原計畫販售林木的情形。

曼谷間會，表面結論未定，但實質上呢？

經過了一星期的協商，曼谷間會無法確認未來氣候協議的方向─可能只是確認坎昆協議的結果，也可能是讓已開發國家做出更符合其應負責任的減量承諾，讓協商機制回到正途。不過無論正確答案為何，碳交易、REDD的機制依然是減碳的主流方式，也是協商代表、主流媒體、許多NGO不願面對的真相；就算最終結果是我們要的減量承諾，已開發國家使用投機取巧，炒作為主的手段，又能讓我們免於遭受氣候災難嗎？

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[1] 有關Chris的經歷可參考http://chrislang.org/about-me/；另外有關他對湄公河地區的觀察分析可見http://chrislang.org/

中國於COP16的新氣候外交

前言

我在FOCUS的實習工作即將進入第五個月。今年與FOCUS同仁共同撰寫中國在COP16氣候外交上的角色與進展，也提出儘管在國際場合獲得掌聲，但仔細看其國內減碳的方式，仍繼續推動風險性高，或減碳效益飽受質疑的再生能源。而這篇文章即將發表於FOCUS中國項目的網站，並提供予一些氣候正義，現在就要！(Climate Justice Now!)中的一些團體參考。

和哥本哈根COP15結束時嚴峻和沮喪的氣氛相較，坎昆的COP16則是以各會員國鬆了一口氣的方式收尾；「坎昆決議拯救了氣候協商」。然而坎昆決議卻無法拯救地球。根據當前的減量承諾，聯合國環境規劃暑(the United Nations Environment Programme )在《排放差異報告》(Emissions Gap Report, November 2010)提出警告，和一九九○年相較，二○二○年前已開發國家僅能減少百分之十六的排放(在最佳情境下)，或者在最差的情境下甚至增加百分之六的排放(不使用碳抵減的評估)，也就是在本世紀末以前全球大氣將可能增溫攝氏五度。

另外，許多在G77與中國集團中的國家抱怨坎昆依然複製了前一年飽受撻伐的密室協商。儘管玻利維亞不斷指出坎昆協定完全走錯路，最後的共識仍是在技術轉移和協助開發中國家調適氣候變遷的綠色氣候基金(Green Climate Fund)。下一次在德本(Durban)的COP17會再就剩下的部分進行協商。

中國和美國的立場和承諾作為一直是協商期間的眾人焦點；此兩大國被視為決定協商結果和我們未來的關鍵。而在坎昆中國和美國看來皆就其期望與準備有所取捨。

本文將討論中國在COP16的新氣候外交及其國內為追求低碳發展所做的努力。我們的分析是中國新的政策和措施仍將延續高成長為前提的能源使用模式，且透過增加非化石能源，如大規模水壩和核能的方式以達成減量目標。

中國在COP16的立場

如同中國國家發展與改革委員會副主任解振華和中國談判代表蘇偉在協商前許多場合所述，中國的基本立場如下：

1. 再次確認京都議定書為在公約與峇里路線圖下具有法律約束力的國際協定，並支持哥本哈根協定；包括：

- 要求附件一國家必須有減量的可測量標準，並提供減量、調適、技術轉移和資金協助與開發中國家。

- 支持哥本哈根協定的長期目標。

- 在開發中國家從已開發國家獲得資金、技術、能力建構協助的前提下，支持開發中國家採用措施以調適氣候變遷。

2. 再次確認「共同但有區別的責任」原則

3. 考量經濟發展權、減貧、保護氣候，以確保發展中國家的發展權；再次確認中國將環境保護納入經濟發展的永續性原則。根據其國情、發展階段與能力，中國將承擔合理的國際責任。

4. 要求附件一國家就減量、調適，與提供開發中國家技術轉移、財務及能力建構支持做出承諾。

報告與透明性：MRV(可測量、可報告、可核實)及ICA(國際磋商與分析)

中國的主要考量之一為「國際磋商與分析」(International Consultation and Analysis，ICA)機制。該機制為測量開發中國家抵抗氣候變遷的作為。

ICA一開始在哥本哈根的COP15提出討論，做為核實(verify)國家排放和行動的正式過程。印度提議ICA機制以縮小中國和美國對於核實議題的歧異，內容則包括開發中國家提出其減量目標，並定期報告如何達成目標，但不須接受國際審查，且若無法達成亦不須接受懲罰。所有的開發中國家皆須遵守該機制，不侷限於主要的排放國，即中國、印度和巴西。

哥本哈根協定提議了建構ICA系統，但尚未定義如何付諸實行。

二○一○年十月在天津的聯合國氣候變遷協商中，中國和美國在美國如何解釋哥本哈根協定上有相當大的歧異，尤其是美國對開發中國家施壓，要求其在ICA中也必須施行將讓開發中國家「自願性」的國內減量行動受到約束性規範的「可測量、可報告、可核實」透明性要求。G77與中國集團認為這無疑將使哥本哈根取代京都議定書與峇里路線圖。

一開始中國大力反對ICA，認為哥本哈根協定缺乏大部分開發中國家的支持，條文對低排放量的國家具不公平性。同時中國要求已開發國家提供予開發中國家的財務和技術支持透明性應更高，堅持ICA必須追求「明確的指導規則、尊重主權的保證，而且是非對抗性的。」

雖然中國強力反對，ICA的文件仍舊在COP16期間廣為流傳。其他的主要排放國，即巴西和南非，亦反對美國的施壓。不過印度環境與森林部長拉梅什(Jairam Ramesh)在一場四小時的會議中遊說中國代表團，希望其妥協。美國在協商結束的前兩天縮小歧異，而中國最終表示「只要給予開發中國家的資金協助透明性問題解決，確保清潔能源技術轉移至貧窮國家，並繼續在一九九七年京都議定書的框架下進行討論，便可妥協。」

坎昆協議和中國的承諾作為

坎昆協議最終要求所有開發中國家遵行ICA。受資金協助的自願性減量行動、國內法和施行時間進成須要以明確的指導規則、尊重主權的保證，而且是非對抗性的方式進行報告和審核。報告包括溫室氣體盤查清冊、減量行動、減量行動施行過程，且國內的MRV將由專家分析。

另一方面，坎昆協議有關資金的部分，沒有解決開發中國家針對哥本哈根協定所批評的問題；包括資金支持的延遲、金額的不足與開發中國家必須具備透明性機制以獲資金的前提。綠色氣候基金是無償給付或為貸款仍不清楚，而許多國家也對世界銀行將成為基金開始三年的受託人相當不滿。

中國在前一年便已宣布將在二○二○年前達成比二○○五年碳密集程度少百分之四十至四十五，改變過去迴避任何具體目標的承諾。另外，中國決定不接受任何氣候資金，亦計劃提供開發中國家，尤其是小島國和非洲國家資金協助其對抗氣候變遷，顯示北京領導氣候外交的新趨勢；中國已於太平洋小島國進行八十多個計畫，如於斐濟的小型水力發電廠，並計畫在二○○八年至二○一三年間進行更多的小型清潔能源計畫。

拯救了京都議定書？

中國視京都議定書為確認已開發和開發中國家間「共同但有區別的責任」的重要和有用機制。和其他的基礎國(巴西、印度、南非)國家與G77國家一致，當日本、俄國、加拿大在協商第二週始表示拒絕延續京都議定書第二期，及美國仍舊不願意簽屬京都議定書時，中國相信京都議定書應該延續其第二期。

解振華在COP16結束後表示：「坎昆取得成功，京都議定書得到堅持。中國和其他基礎國成功捍衛開發中國家的需求，抵擋美國無理的要求。」且「中國對協商結果非常滿意。」但許多分析家認為，坎昆協議實際上維持並合法化二○○九年的哥本哈根協定，甚至指出坎昆讓京都議定書所堅持的已開發國家必須做出具約束性的承諾作為，而不是自願性的減量宣誓的原則倒退。

綠化中國

中國在COP16提出了完整的減量和能源效率目標，大受國際歡迎，國際上普遍認為中國更加綠化，對環境更加友善。

目標包括：

1. 節能與能源效率。中國正在加速結束過時的能源，關閉了許多無法達成目標的小型工廠和發電廠，如水泥、鋼鐵工廠等。另外，如中國國務院總理溫家寶在COP15前所示，每單位GDP的排放每五年將減少百分之二十，目標在二○一○至二○二○年間與二○○五年程度相較每單位GDP排放將減少百分之四十至四十五。(中國發改委等，“Addressing Climate Change: China in Action 2010”)

2. 綠色能源發展，包括再生能源、太陽能、水力發電與核能。二○一○年四月中國能源法的修訂納入綠色能源基金的條文，以發展風力、太陽能等的再生能源。中國目前是核電廠在建數量最多的國家，水力發電的能力是世界第一。其太陽能和風能也正在大幅增長。(中國發改委等，“Addressing Climate Change: China in Action 2010”)

中國的十二五計畫(二○一一年至二○一五年)將提到能源效率和綠色能源發展計畫，而排放減量的目標則在天津協商中宣布。中國提出的目標不僅受到中國NGO的讚賞，也受到國際上關注談判的NGO的好評。國際NGO和美國團體常常引用中國提出的承諾作為，以批評美國缺乏國內能源政策和其極低的減量目標。

不確我們更應注意到低碳的發電方式將主要以水力達成。中國計畫其水力發電將由二○○五年的117.0 GW增加到二○一○年的190.0 GW和二○二○年的300.0 GW。核電目標則從二○○五年的7.0 GW到二○一○年的12.0 GW和二○二○年的70.0 GW；也就是在二○○五年占低碳發電量的百分之五˙四六至二○二○年的百分之十三˙四六。(中國發改委，二○一○年)

中國表示為了減排承諾水力發電無可避免，因為是最低成本的再生能源。在十一五期間(二○○六年到二○一○年)由於土石流、泥沙沉積和環境系統受損等環境問題，僅三分之一的水電建設達成政策目標。

二○○九年有關先前因環評未通過而停工的兩座水壩再度復工引起相當大爭議。復工不免是因為停工的能源損失約等於近幾年太陽能和風能所產生的所有電力。目前興建水電的計畫也顯示了水壩仍舊是政府偏好的電力來源；二○二○年水力發電仍預期會占低碳能源的百分之五七˙六九。

然而很多問題仍須解決。大部分了建設位址集中在西南部省份，也就是具地理脆弱性和生物多樣性高的地方。不僅人民的居所和土地將遭威脅，水壩產生的甲烷排放可能超過水電所省下的碳排放。

而核電的部分，中國有全世界最多的核電廠。除了目前運作的十三個場址外，更有二十五個核電廠在建，並計畫興建上百座，速度是每年十座，在接下來十年將占全球四分之三的核電廠，儘管二○一○年五月和十月發生了大亞灣核電廠輻射外洩事件。(另外可參考中國計畫興建核電廠址的地圖http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf63.html)二○○九年八月，中國核工業集團公司原總經理康日新收賄兩億六千萬美金的圍標核電廠事件，引發了安全性的疑慮。(紐約時報，二○○九年十二月十五日)

中國的清潔發展機制和碳交易市場

在二○○九年底之前，有兩千兩百七十九個清潔發展機制(Clean Development Mechanism)經發改委批准，其中有六百七十三個計畫已經在二○一○年底前發行了排放減量信用額度(Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs))，且目前中國占了全球清潔發展機制百分之九十六的排放減量信用額度。即便如此，幾個水電廠和風電廠因無法達成額外性要求而受拒。歐洲委員會也提議從二○一三年一月始，將禁止特定工業溫室氣體即三氟甲烷(HFC-23)和氧化亞氮(N20)減量納入歐盟碳交易系統(EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS))，而全球十九個有關三氟甲烷的計畫，中國便占了十一個。

除了註冊的問題，也應注意中國有許多清潔發展機制包括許多大規模的水電廠，將對社會和環境造成負面影響，占了六百七十三個計畫的一百八十五個，而在二○一○年，有百分之六十獲得信用額度的水電廠位於中國。(UNFCCC，二○一○年)

中國已經建立了好幾個碳交易平台；包括二○○八年設立的上海環境與能源交易所、天津氣候交易所、中國北京環境交易所，與二○○九年設立的山西、武漢、杭州、昆明、深圳等交易所。

全球碳交易市場預計在二○二○年達到三兆五千億美金，而中國的排放減量權預計將佔百分之七十。儘管如此。中國認為大部分清潔發展機制的利潤落到外國投機者的口袋，而中國國內的公司只能當中介，期透過發展第二級碳產品以獲利。國內的碳交易平台已經建立，但整體施行方式的細節仍在討論中。「熊貓標準」的便是為了中國自願性溫室氣體減量而設計。中國認為發展國內的市場可以避免清潔發展機制的減量權在國際上受拒或駁回的問題，也是比必須真正關閉耗能的製造業或不使用煤炭，預計每年得花上一兆人民幣的成本來達成二○三○年的排放峰值還來的便宜。

更好的協商策略，但偏好如故

COP16期間中國的NGO和許多國際團體引用中國減量的努力成果，以和美國的不作為比較。中國更好的準備和溝通技巧表現了其在國際上新的外交能力和協商力量。中國不斷強調和G77集團在同一陣線，卻有許多人也察覺到中國和其他開發中國家漸行漸遠。

更重要的是，仔細審視中國如何施行其綠色政策，便發現仍舊沒有放棄一如往常的模式。其清潔能源計畫重心在誘因為國內補助和國際清潔發展機制的大規模水電和核電，儘管中國國內和國際上的撻伐聲四起，該兩種能源將無疑將繼續。不管挑戰為何，如清潔發展機制獲利不夠，未來將被排除在歐盟碳交易體系之外，對水電和核能問題越來越多的公共意識，中國的能源政策強調其將持續。雖然在COP16中國的領導角色廣受矚目，但在協商背後犧牲人民和環境清楚顯示，拯救京都議定書不等同於拯救我們的地球。